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ABSTRACT 
Incomplete Risk Adjustment and Adverse Selection in the German Public Health 
Insurance System  
by Thomas Knaus and Robert Nuscheler* 
The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To 
avoid adverse selection, a prospective risk compensation scheme was introduced in 
1994. Due to their low contribution rates, company-based sickness funds were able to 
attract a lot of new members. We analyze – using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel – the determinants of these transitions from 1995 to 2000. By 
estimating a simultaneous two equation system, we find that health status positively, 
and significantly, affects the probability of changing to a company-based sickness fund, 
especially after controlling for age. Thus the risk compensation scheme does not fully 
control for the health status of the changers. Consequently, the comparative advantages 
of company-based funds will increase over time. This observation provides evidence for 
the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: Health insurance choice, adverse selection, risk compensation, bivariate 
 probit model, health production 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Unvollständiger Risikostrukturausgleich und Adverse Selektion in der 
Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung Deutschlands  
In der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung wurde 1996 Wettbewerb zwischen den 
Krankenkassen eingeführt. Um Adverse Selektion zu verhindern wurde 1994 ein 
prospektiver Risikostrukturausgleich eingeführt. Aufgrund ihrer niedrigen Beitragssätze 
konnten die Betriebskrankenkassen eine Vielzahl neuer Mitglieder gewinnen. Wir 
nutzen Daten des Sozio-Oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um diese Wechselbewegungen 
für den Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2000 zu analysieren. Ein Zweigleichungssystem wird 
simultan geschätzt. Es zeigt sich, dass der Gesundheitszustand, nachdem insbesondere 
für Alter kontrolliert wurde, die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu einer Betriebskrankenkasse zu 
wechseln signifikant positiv beeinflusst. Der Risikostrukturausgleich gleicht also Unter-
schiede im Gesundheitszustand nicht vollständig aus. Die komparativen Wettbewerbs-
vorteile der Betriebskrankenkassen werden somit über die Zeit ansteigen. Dies liefert 
Evidenz für das bekannte separierende Gleichgewicht von Rothschild und Stiglitz. 
1 Introduction
During the last decades there have been many health care reforms in Germany. Most of
these reforms were aimed at cost-containment. With the Health Care Reform Act 1989 the
movement towards more competition in the health care market began. The Health Care
Structure Act 1993 introduced more competition among the statutory health insurance
companies.
About 90 percent of the German population are insured in statutory sickness funds
(in Germany the health insurance companies are called sickness funds), most of them
compulsorily. Since 1996 essentially free choice of sickness funds exists. To avoid adverse
selection, sickness funds are not allowed to reject new applicants. Furthermore a risk
compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. In this transfer scheme the contributions
to the funds are redistributed according to the risk structure of the funds. The scheme is
based on income, age, gender, sick pay claims, and incapacity for work. It was introduced
to prevent sickness funds with better risk structures from having comparative advantages.
Nevertheless, the fear of adverse selection as a consequence of sickness fund competition
has been expressed quite often (see Lauterbach and Wille, 2001, p. 209).
As about 95 percent of the beneﬁts of the funds are regulated by the Social Code
Book V, it is usually argued that competition between sickness funds is mainly in terms
of contribution rates (see e.g. Lauterbach and Wille, 2001, p. 29). If this were true, then
health status would not have any eﬀect on health insurance choice. However the remaining
5 percent of beneﬁts may be decisive. The company-based sickness funds provide only
very few of these extra beneﬁts, while a substantial amount is provided on average by all
the other funds. Since the healthy are more likely to switch to company-based sickness
funds, the standard Rothschild/Stiglitz separating equilibrium arises where bad risks get
full coverage at high premiums and good risks have partial coverage and low premiums.
The central research question of this paper is whether the introduction of competition
between funds and free choice for individuals has led to adverse selection in the German
Public Health Insurance System. To answer that question, we distinguish four diﬀerent
types of sickness funds: regional funds, substitute funds, company-based funds, and other
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funds. As the company-based sickness funds, known as Betriebskrankenkassen (BKKs),
have substantially lower contribution rates than all the other funds, it is usually argued
that there is adverse selection in favor of the BKKs. Consequently we only analyze the
movement towards the BKKs and its determinants.
A major issue in our analysis is disentangling health eﬀects and age eﬀects. Younger
people are, on average, more likely to switch to a BKK. These people may be better
informed about the possibility of switching or may simply have lower transaction costs of
doing this. Healthy people are also more likely to change. As age is the most important
determinant of health, a multivariate analysis is necessary to judge whether there is still
a health eﬀect after controlling for age. Potentially, a standard probit model is able
to separate health eﬀects from age eﬀects. However, the results will be biased due to
endogeneity. The health status variable in our data set is a discrete variable rather than
continuous like actual health. Thus, health is measured with an error. Since age is a
major determinant of health and of the probability of switching to a BKK, this is a
source of endogeneity. We solve that problem by applying a simultaneous two equation
probit model.
In our ﬁrst equation we measure health status. As a proxy for individual health and
especially for health care use, we use the self-assessed health status. Regressing more
objective measures of health, such as visits to a doctor and hospital stays, on self-assessed
health we obtain a continuous index measuring individual health. Other determinants
aﬀecting health are, e.g., age, gender, and disability. In our transition equation we include
the variables used in the risk compensation scheme, the ﬁtted health index, and some
control variables. The resulting recursive bivariate probit model is estimated by a two-
stage maximum likelihood procedure.
Using 1995 to 2000 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of individual health on the probability of switching to a BKK, i.e., there is
adverse selection. Since we control for the variables used in the risk adjustment scheme,
risk compensation is incomplete. The adjusters are imperfect signals of actual health.
Our analysis shows that the scheme can be improved simply by additionally adjusting for
the health status index obtained from our ﬁrst equation. Moreover, we ﬁnd hazardous
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dynamics in the German public health insurance market. The willingness to switch to
a BKK increases rapidly over time and with it the distortions caused by comparative
advantages due to risk structure.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we control for endogeneity of health
in the transition equation. Second, we use a generated continuous health index instead of
the discrete health measure usually used. We thus provide a measure that can be used to
improve the risk adjustment scheme. And third, we ﬁnd a clear cut health eﬀect in the
transition equation using GSOEP data.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the related literature in more
detail. In section 3 we provide some more institutional details for the German health
care system. In section 4 we present a theoretical model. The data set used, namely the
GSOEP, and sample selection is described in section 5. Some descriptive statistics will
also be shown. The econometric model is presented in section 6. Estimation results are
discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
There is a large ongoing public policy debate on the issue of adverse selection and incom-
plete risk adjustment in Germany. In their recent report, Lauterbach and Wille (2001)
analyze whether those individuals who change their sickness fund entail lower health
care costs than individuals who stay with their fund. They use micro data provided by
several sickness funds and ﬁnd that changers have a positive eﬀect on proﬁts after risk
compensation is carried out. This result still holds when controlling for age.1 Moreover,
Lauterbach and Wille (2001) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
to underline this result. As there are no health care cost ﬁgures in the data set but several
variables explaining health status and health care use, they employ a factor analysis to
1Following Lauterbach and Wille (2001) the risk compensation scheme is incomplete. As the sickness
funds have a positive proﬁt margin when attracting new members, they propose to include a “change-
status” variable in the scheme to remove these proﬁts. Using a diﬀerent data set, Jacobs et al. (2002)
also ﬁnd that changers cause lower health care costs than non-changers.
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ﬁgure out the relationship between age and health status and age and health care use.
They ﬁnd that, on average, changers have better health. As changers are younger and
as age is highly correlated with individual health, it is per se not clear whether there is
still a positive health eﬀect after controlling for age. But this is essential when judging
on the risk compensation scheme. As mentioned above, the scheme oﬀsets diﬀerences in
age structures by transferring money from funds with a good (young) age proﬁle to funds
with a bad (old) age proﬁle. If the health eﬀect is not signiﬁcant after controlling for age,
then the risk compensation scheme completely controls for diﬀerent health structures via
oﬀsetting age diﬀerences. The current paper ﬁlls this gap using a diﬀerent econometric
model, namely, a simultaneous two equation probit model. Thereby we are able to dis-
entangle health and age eﬀects and can assess the completeness of the risk adjustment
scheme appropriately.
Andersen and Schwarze (1999) also analyze the determinants of a sickness fund change
using GSOEP data. They concentrate on 1997 and 1998. In their single probit equation
model, individual health satisfaction positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability
of changing. At the same time, they obtain a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of self-assessed
health on the probability of transition. As both variables are measures of the actual
health status, the overall eﬀect of health remains unclear. Moreover, the diﬀerent signs
raise doubts about the appropriateness of the speciﬁcation. In the recent work of Schwarze
and Andersen (2001), the eﬀect of the contribution rate on the probability of changing
is analyzed. Using 1999 and 2000 GSOEP data and matched contribution rates of the
sickness funds, they ﬁnd that a higher contribution rate in 1999 signiﬁcantly increases the
probability of changing the sickness fund. Since contribution rate data is not available
before 1999 we cannot include them in our analysis. As a proxy we use dummies for the
diﬀerent types of health insurance companies. Concerning health status, the eﬀects in
Schwarze and Andersen (2001) are ambiguous and insigniﬁcant.
In both papers by Andersen and Schwarze, a standard single equation probit model is
applied. They use the discrete health status variable from the GSOEP as an explanatory
variable. This causes an endogeneity bias. The actual (self-assessed) health status is a
continuous rather than discrete variable. Consequently, when using the discrete variable,
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health is measured with an error. Since the health status aﬀects the probability to change
to a sickness fund the error of health status is likely to be correlated with the error of the
transition equation. We solve this endogeneity problem by applying a simultaneous two
equation probit model. In a retirement model, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) also control for
the endogeneity of self-assessed health. We use a ﬁtted health index, derived from a probit
regression, as an explanatory variable in the transition equation. Using health indexes
rather than the discrete variable obtained from surveys is common in recent research.
Van Doorslaer and Jones (2002), for example, obtain a continuous health index from an
ordered probit regression and use this index to measure inequality in self-assessed health.
For a similar approach see Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer (1994).
Since the self-assessed health status plays a central role in our analysis, our paper
is related to the literature using or explaining self-assessed health. Bound (1991), for
instance, uses the self-assessed health status as an explanatory variable in a retirement
model. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1992) derive a health index using self-assessed health. Most
important is the recent work of Crossley and Kennedy (2002) on the reliability of self-
assessed health. They ﬁnd a substantial error in rating and also ﬁnd that this error is
highly correlated with observable variables like age, gender, and income. Thus, as already
argued above, using a single probit procedure leads to a serious bias. This underlines the
importance of our simultaneous approach.
Furthermore, the current paper is related to the econometrics literature on bivariate
probit models. Heckman (1978) also treats the bivariate probit model without structural
shift (his case 3). This model goes back to Ashford and Sowden (1970), Amemiya (1975),
and Zellner and Lee (1965). Mallar (1977) provides a consistent two-stage estimator of
the bivariate probit model. This estimator and its covariance matrix is shown in Maddala
(1983, pp. 246-247).
There are very few applications of the bivariate probit model with endogenous re-
gressors in the ﬁeld of health economics. One exception is Holly et al. (1998). They
study the relation of health insurance coverage and health care utilization in the Swiss
health care market, i.e. they are concerned with moral hazard where we focus on adverse
selection. Their econometric model diﬀers from ours in that they apply a bivariate probit
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model with an endogenous dummy variable while we consider the latent variable to be
endogenous.
3 Institutional background
In 1977 the rapid growth of health care expenditure was stopped by the Health Insurance
Cost-Containment Act. With this reform, an advisory body to the government, the so-
called Concerted Action Committee in Health Care, was created. Its major task is to
keep contribution rates constant. This essentially means that the increase in health care
expenditure is limited to the increase in contributory income. Nevertheless, in the 1980s
the contribution rates increased from 11.4 percent of gross income to 13 percent.2 This
pressure led to several additional health care reforms. 1989 can be seen as a starting point
for introducing more competition into the health care market. Blue collar workers were put
on par with white collar workers. They were now allowed to opt out the statutory health
insurance if a certain threshold income is exceeded and buy private health insurance.3 At
this time, there was no free choice of sickness funds within the public health insurance
system. Depending on their profession, members of the regional based funds were allowed
to change to substitute funds and other funds (including guild funds, farmers’ funds, the
miners’ fund, and the sailors’ fund).4 They were only allowed to change to a company-
based fund (BKK) if they were actually employed in the company the fund was designed
for. As a result of this limited competition, the contribution rates of the regional funds
were signiﬁcantly higher than those of the BKKs and the substitute funds (see ﬁgure 1).5
2See Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀairs,
2001 (table 7.7).
3The information presented here and in the following is mainly taken from European Observatory on
Health Care Systems, EOHCS (2000). For a more detailed description see EOHCS (2000, pp. 21-37,
107-116).
4The Techniker Krankenkasse (technicians sickness fund), for example, was designed for technicians
and engineers only.
5In 1991 the average contribution rate in Western Germany of the regional funds was 12.75 percent of
gross income, while it was 10.84 and 12.04 for the BKKs and substitute funds, respectively (Bundesmin-
6
[ﬁgure 1 about here]6
With the Health Care Structure Act of 1993, competition in the health insurance
market was intensiﬁed. All insured people were allowed to choose their sickness funds
freely from 1996 onwards. To oﬀset comparative advantages due to risk structure, a risk
compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. Competition and the risk compensation
scheme led to an adaptation of the contribution rates of the non-BKK funds. Unfortu-
nately, we are not able to separate the competition eﬀect from the compensation eﬀect.
In 2001 the BKKs depart substantially from the average contribution rate of all other
funds. Since 1993 the BKKs have, on average, the lowest contribution rates. As is shown
in table 1, competition between the sickness funds has led to a consolidation of the health
insurance market. Due to mergers and market exits, the number of funds fell from 1,209
in 1991 by more than two thirds to 396 in 2001.
[table 1 about here]
More interesting for the question addressed in this paper are the transitions from one
sickness fund to another. For the sake of presentation, we only show the trend for the
members of the three main types of sickness funds, namely, regional funds, substitute
funds, and BKKs (see ﬁgure 2). The regional funds continuously lost members from 1991
onwards. This trend actually started much earlier. In 1970, 52.4 percent of the statutory
insured population in Western Germany were insured by regional funds. This number
dropped to 42.8 percent in 1991 and 37.0 percent 2001. This was due to the higher
average contribution rates (see ﬁgure 1). Members facing the high premiums changed to
substitute funds if they were allowed to do so. In 1970, 22.9 percent of West Germany’s
statutory insured population were insured in substitute funds. The share increased to 34.0
percent in 1991, peaked in 1997 (37.1 percent), and then dropped back to 33.9 percent in
2001 (all numbers were taken from BMG, 2001, p. 345).
isterium fu¨r Gesundheit, BMG, Federal Ministry of Health, 2001, p. 396).
6In this version of the paper all ﬁgures and tables have been relegated to the appendix.
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[ﬁgure 2 about here]
The increase in members in BKKs, together with the drop of the average BKK contri-
bution rate from 1997 onwards, may be interpreted as an indication that risk separation
favors the BKKs. From ﬁgures 1 and 2 one may conclude that the risk compensation
scheme does not fully control for the diﬀerent risk structures. There is a big political
debate in Germany about this issue. The risk compensation is done in the following
way: the contributions of each fund are multiplied by a factor that measures the average
contribution rate over all funds that is used for health care beneﬁts. This amount is
transferred to the clearing authority (Bundesversicherungsamt, Federal Insurance Oﬃce).
The amount remaining to the funds is used to cover administrative costs. With this step,
diﬀerent income proﬁles are oﬀset. Each member of each fund is then assigned to one of
more than 100 risk groups that are created on the basis of three variables: age, gender,
and incapacity for work. Diﬀerences in sick pay claim expenses are oﬀset separately. For
each person insured the fund gets back the average amount of health care expenditure
over all funds in the respective risk group. If a fund has a good risk structure then there
is a positive net payment to the clearing authority that beneﬁts a fund with a bad risk
structure. Thereby, diﬀerent risk structures should be oﬀset and with them comparative
advantages due to risk structure. A sickness fund obtains positive proﬁts when health
care expenditure is below the average or if administrative costs are low. Thus the risk
compensation scheme rewards relative competitiveness and cost-containment. Whether
this compensation scheme completely controls for health status and/or health care use
is the question addressed in the current paper. Reports using data provided by sickness
funds usually conclude that the risk adjustment scheme is incomplete, i.e. that there is
still a health eﬀect after risk compensation is carried out (see Breyer and Kifmann, 2001,
and Lauterbach and Wille, 2001). The federal government plans to include a morbidity
measure into the transfer scheme in 2007. Using a bivariate probit model, we show that
this result is also obtained when using GSOEP data. We thus underline the necessity of
including a kind of morbidity measures in the transfer scheme. Moreover, we show that
a simple health status index can be used to reduce the distortions found the German
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statutory health insurance market.
4 A theoretical model
As mentioned above, it may be concluded from ﬁgures 1 and 2 that there is adverse
selection in the German statutory health insurance market even though risk compensation
is carried out. The average contribution rate of the BKKs are signiﬁcantly lower than
those of all the other funds. This points to a better health structure of the BKKs.
In the introduction, we mentioned that it is usually argued that competition between
sickness funds is in terms of contribution rates since 95 percent of the health care beneﬁts
are regulated by the state. If the beneﬁts were really the same, then healthy and unhealthy
people should have the same incentive to switch since both can beneﬁt from the lower
contribution rate without losing any health care beneﬁts. It can be argued that sick people
and bad risks have higher transaction costs of changing. Sick people usually have better
things to do, e.g. undergoing treatments, than changing their fund. Bad risks may have
lower beneﬁts from changing. When they need some treatment for which they must have
an approval from their fund in order to be reimbursed, they are informed how to apply,
and whom to ask, since it is likely that they have previously applied for a treatment. This
information would be lost if they changed the fund. The weakness of this argument is
that transaction costs are not observable.
The unobservability of transaction costs, together with the substantial variation in
extra beneﬁts, mean that it would seem very likely that these extra beneﬁts are decisive
for health insurance choice. When insurance coverage matters, simple insurance theory
can be applied to characterize the movement of the German public health insurance
system. Consider a competitive health insurance market and two types of potential health
insurance buyers: bad risks with a high probability of health care use and good risks
with a low probability. Then the standard Rothschild/Stiglitz separating contract (see
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) would have fair premiums for both types, but only part
coverage for the good risks while the bad risks receive full coverage. Part coverage prevents
selection of the bad risks although the premiums are lower. It turns out that the BKKs
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only provide very few of these 5 percent extra beneﬁts whereas all other funds provide
quite a lot (see AFW Dienstleistungsgesellschaft, 2002). Hence, the BKKs only provide
part coverage and all other funds (nearly) full coverage. The healthy individuals care less
about health beneﬁts than sick people as they are unlikely to demand any treatments. On
the other hand, health care beneﬁts are decisive for bad risks as they are likely to need
them. Thus, by reducing beneﬁts the BKKs can set a lower premium than all the other
funds without attracting the bad risks. Adverse selection is used for cream skimming.
Given that transaction costs are negligible and that the health care beneﬁts are not
decisive for health insurance choice, it is diﬃcult to explain in economic terms why more
healthy people are more likely to be in a BKK or are more likely to change to a BKK. One
potential argument is: when a person is sick and consumes treatments, he does not want
to switch since he wants to pay back the costs of the current treatment with future contri-
butions. This is not very convincing, since an individual who is sick today is more likely
to be a bad risk. So if the person insured wants to do his fund a favor he should switch
rather than staying with the fund. Another non-standard explanation is loss aversion.
Sick people are informed about the health care beneﬁts of their fund, but uninformed
about the beneﬁts of all the other funds. Healthy people are also uninformed about the
beneﬁts of their funds as they have not yet purchased any treatment. The asymmetry for
the sick people makes it more likely that they will stay with their fund than the healthy
who ﬁnd themselves in a symmetric situation. Since information on beneﬁts can easily be
obtained from the internet for a lot of funds (see AFW Dienstleistungsgesellschaft, 2002),
loss aversion cannot explain the situation of the German public health insurance.
After other potential explanations are ruled out, the Rothschild/Stiglitz equilibrium
remains as the only convincing theoretical prediction. The BKKs reduce their beneﬁts
and simultaneously cut their contribution rates. Thereby the BKKs mainly select the
healthy. All the other funds are left with the bad risks and, consequently, with high
premiums. Since this equilibrium forecasts the situation observed in Germany exactly,
the hypothesis for our empirical model is a positive (and signiﬁcant) health eﬀect in
the transition equation. This hypothesis will be conﬁrmed. This implies that the risk
adjustment scheme is incomplete and thus makes risk selection beneﬁcial.
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5 Data, sample selection, and descriptive statistics
To explore health and health insurance choice in Germany after the natural experiment in
1996 we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representa-
tive longitudinal study of private households in Germany. The same private households,
persons and families have been surveyed annually since 1984. This micro data panel pro-
vides extensive information on the individual characteristics needed to analyze health and
health insurance choice in Germany.7
The empirical results presented in this study are based on the waves from 1995 to
2000. In 1998 the GSOEP was extended by the Supplementary Sample E. The Sample F
was a major extension of the GSOEP in 2000. Both samples are included in our analysis.
The diﬀerent waves are pooled into one sample.
The two dependent variables to be explained by our empirical model are health status
and health insurance choice. Health status is collapsed into a discrete dummy variable
representing good health (y1 = 1) and bad health (y1 = 0). It is constructed from the
variable “(self-assessed) health status at present”, which is dicretized into ﬁve categories,
by collapsing good health and very good health to y1 = 1. The second dependent variable
to be explained is the switch to a company-based sickness fund (BKK) which became
possible after 1995. The dummy variable is constructed to equal one for individuals who
were not member in a BKK in one year but are members in the following year. These are
the two generated dependent variables in our two equations system. We analyze the ﬂow
to the BKK and not the stock of individuals in the BKK. We thereby explicitly take the
dynamics in the public health insurance system into account.
As a sub-sample of these six waves of data we selected only individuals who were not
privately insured. Only individuals who were members of the statutory health insurance
are included, since they were the only ones who had new incentives to change to a BKK
after the 1993 reform. Since we are interested in the determinants of movements to BKKs
we selected only individuals who were not members of a BKK before the change, i.e. we
7For more information on the GSOEP see Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer (1993) and also Pro-
jektgruppe Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (1995).
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do not consider movements from one BKK to another. Since family insured members
have only limited freedom to choose their health insurance, they were excluded. Finally,
we restricted our sample to the working population aged between 25 and 54. This is
done in order to exclude special incentives for individuals in the education system and for
those close to retirement. The sample sizes before and after selection are shown in table
2. In this table we also show the percentage of changers in every year, calculated from
the selected samples. From 1995 to 1996 only 1.23 percent of the sample changed to a
BKK. This number increased continuously to 4.17 percent in 1999 with an average over
all years of 2.8 percent. These numbers show the increasing willingness to change. This
may be due to incentives increasing over time, since the contribution rate diﬀerential was
also increasing (see ﬁgure 1). But it may also reﬂect the fact that the information about
the possibility of changing has spread over time. In the transition equation, taking 1995
as the reference year, positive coeﬃcients for the year dummies that increase over time
would be expected for the estimation results. Explanations of the variables (table 4) and
the entire sample statistics based on the pooled selected sample (table 5) are shown in
the appendix .
[table 2 about here]
Table 3 shows the main relationship we focus on in this paper. On average, 2.8 percent
of the population in our sample enrolls in a BKK every year during our period of analysis.
This proportion is declining with age. 4 percent of the youngest age group, between 25
and 29 years old, change to a BKK. On the other hand, only around 2 percent of the
two oldest age groups between 45 and 54 years old change. We can also see from table 3
that around 70 percent of the changers are healthy, while only less than 60 percent of the
non-changers say they are healthy. This means that changers are likely to be healthier.
Thus, changers are not only younger, they are also healthier. The question is whether the
transition probability is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by age, health, or both. When controlling
for age, it is unclear whether a signiﬁcant health eﬀect remains. To disentangle age eﬀects
and health eﬀects, a multivariate analysis must be used. Because of its major advantages
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over single probit procedures, as argued before, we use a simultaneous two equation system
as an empirical speciﬁcation to address this issue.
[table 3 about here]
6 The empirical model
Usually the transition from one sickness fund to another is modelled by a standard probit
model8 of the form
y∗2 = β2x2 + α · (health status) + 2,
where y∗2 is an unobserved latent variable that assumes a positive value when the under-
lying observable indicator variable y2 is equal to one and a negative value when y2 equals
zero. y2 = 1 indicates that the individual actually switched to a BKK and zero if not.
The set of exogenous variables is denoted x2. It contains controls such as age, gender,
income, and so forth. Usually health status is included as an additional discrete exoge-
nous variable. But, as already argued in the introduction, the estimates are biased due to
endogeneity. The actual (self-assessed) health status is a continuous variable rather than
a discrete one. The discrete variable measures health with an error. Since health status
aﬀects the probability of changing a sickness fund, the error of health status is likely to be
correlated with the error of the transition equation. This argument is supported by the
recent work of Crossley and Kennedy (2002). They analyze the reliability of self-assessed
health for Australian data. Individuals are asked to rate their health twice, before and
after an additional set of health related questions. As about 28 percent change their rat-
ing, there is a reasonable error in self-assessed health. They ﬁnd that the error is strongly
related to observable variables such as age, gender, income, and so forth. Since we use
all these variables as regressors in our transition equation, introducing the discrete health
measure as an additional explanatory variable would lead to seriously biased estimates.
In contrast, our simultaneous approach provides consistent estimates.
8For the standard probit model see for example Greene (1997, pp. 873-888).
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Moreover, active individuals are likely to be more healthy. We try to capture this by
including the variable “active sport” in the health status equation. However, although this
variable is not a very accurate approximation of activity, it is the best measure available
in the GSOEP. Since the transition itself is also a measure of activity, there is potentially
another source of correlation between the error terms, i.e. another source for endogeneity.9
To control for the endogeneity, and to obtain consistent estimates, we consider the
following recursive bivariate probit model:
y∗1 = β1x1 + 1,(1)
y∗2 = β2x2 + αy
∗
1 + 2.(2)
Both latent variables y∗1 and y
∗











for i = 1, 2
are observable. The ﬁrst equation describes the individual (self-assessed) health status.
Latent health, denoted y∗1, is estimated by a couple of more objective measures for health,
such as doctor visits, hospital stay, long periods of absence from work due to illness, and
so forth. A number of control variables are also included, e.g. age, gender, and income.
As mentioned in the preceding section, y1 = 1 indicates good health or very good health.
As in the ordinary probit model, the parameter values are only identiﬁed up to con-
stants. Actually, equation (1) is a standard probit model. Let λi, i = 1, 2, denote the
standard errors of the reduced form residuals, then—as in the standard probit model—
only β1/λ1 can be estimated. For equation (2), we have to distinguish between the
exogenous variables x2 and the endogenous variable y
∗
1. For the exogenous variables, as
for the ﬁrst equation, only β2/λ2 can be estimated. For the endogenous variable we have
αλ1/λ2. For the structural form disturbances 1 and 2 let V ar(i) = σi, i = 1, 2 and
Cov(1, 2) = σ12. Then only σ1/λ1, σ2/λ2, and σ12/(λ1λ2) are identiﬁed. Of course,
σ1 = λ1 since the structural form of equation (1) coincides with its reduced form.
10 For
9Including y∗2 as an explanatory variable in the health status equation does not change the results.
We excluded it from the paper since the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant.
10For a more general treatment see Maddala (1983, pp. 93-96, 246).
14
identiﬁcation of the model, there must be at least one variable in x1 that is not in x2
in order to obtain some variation for the estimation of α. x2 may contain a number of
additional variables not included in x1.
Following Maddala (1983, p. 246), the bivarate probit model given by equations (1)
and (2) is estimated by a two-stage maximum likelihood procedure. First, the health
status equation (1) is estimated by ordinary probit. Second, the ﬁtted values are used
in the transition equation (2). The estimate of the structural equation is again obtained
by ordinary probit. As was shown by Mallar (1977), this estimator is consistent. The
covariance matrix is provided in Maddala (1983, p. 247). As a consequence of the
estimation procedure, we control for endogeneity of health status in the transition equation
but neglect potential correlation between the error terms.
Note, that is is also possible to estimate an ordered probit model for the ﬁrst equation.
However, the estimation results of the transition equation are extremely robust. So, in
principle, collapsing self-assessed health from 5 to 2 categories is unnecessary.
In contrast to Holly et al. (1998), we decided to use the unobserved latent variable
as endogenous rather than the observed dichotomous variable. Individual health status is
likely to be a continuous variable not properly approximated by a dichotomous variable.
Thus, the ﬁtted health status index yields a much better explanation of actual health
than the dummy variable.
7 Results
The estimation results are presented in table 6 (see appendix). The most important
result is the positive eﬀect of health status on the transition probability. The marginal
signiﬁcance level is about 7 percent. This means that there is a substantial amount of
adverse selection in the system.
7.1 Health status equation
The variables measuring health care utilization, i.e. a doctor visit (visit to a doctor), the
number of doctor visits, and a hospital stay, signiﬁcantly reduce the individual health
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status. Additionally, health status is also a product of the personal health and sickness
history. This history is approximated by the likelihood of impairment due to illness,
the probability of being disabled, being unable to work (incapacity for work), and being
absent from work because of illness for at least six weeks during the last year (sick 6
weeks). All these events and characteristics inﬂuence the health status of the individual
negatively and are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Health also decreases signiﬁcantly with age. The eﬀect of age on health already points
to the diﬃculty of disentangling age eﬀects and health eﬀects in the transition equation.
This relationship also shows the potential problems society will have to face when the
demographic aging trend continues.
A very important variable is whether individuals are actively doing sport at least once
a month. The eﬀect on health is positive and highly signiﬁcant. As mentioned in section
6, this variable may be source of endogeneity. This variable is also very important from
the health production theory perspective, put forward in the seminal work of Grossman
(1972), since active sport can be seen as a proxy for investments in health capital which
increases health capital in a dynamic framework.
Higher education, measured by the time spent in the education system, yields signif-
icantly better health. This reﬂects the complementarity between education and health.
Dummies indicating diﬀerent levels of education were excluded due to their statistical
insigniﬁcance. However, they did not change the pattern of results presented here.
Women report better health although this is statistically insigniﬁcant. Unemploy-
ment signiﬁcantly reduces health. Of course, with unemployment there could be reverse
causality. Since this relationship is not the main focus of our analysis, we do not follow
this route and just include unemployment as a control variable. Foreigners report sig-
niﬁcantly better health. White collar workers are found to be signiﬁcantly healthier on
average. This is plausible because their jobs tend to be physically less demanding.
Finally, the log of net income is included in the health production function to measure
the access to the economic resources of health production. Furthermore, net income is a
proxy for education, since education aﬀects wage earning abilities. Although it has the
right positive sign, the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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7.2 Transition equation
The most important result of our empirical investigation is that health status positively
aﬀects the probability of changing to a company-based sickness fund (BKK). We obtain
a marginal signiﬁcance level of around 7 percent. This result provides evidence for a
substantial amount of adverse selection in the German statutory health insurance system.
In the institutional background section, we argued that there is already adverse selection
in the market, since the contribution rates of the BKKs are, on average, well below those
of all other types of funds. Our analysis shows that this problem will become increasingly
severe over time, since it is the healthy who are more likely to change. Note that health
is signiﬁcant, although we control for the variables included in the risk compensation
scheme, i.e. gross income, age, gender, and incapacity for work.11 Risk adjustment based
on these variables does not fully control for health status, because, otherwise, the health
eﬀect would be insigniﬁcant. Therefore, the risk compensation scheme now in operation
in Germany is not complete. The scheme should be reshaped to take better account of
health, e.g. by including some measures of morbidity. This is on the political agenda
and the discussion about it is lively. The current plans propose introducing a morbidity
oriented risk compensation scheme in 2007. Our analysis shows the necessity of such a
reform by presenting the dynamics of transition. Moreover, we provide a measure, i.e.
the individual health status index, that can be used to improve the scheme.
Apart from their health status, individuals with higher gross income (measured in
logs) are signiﬁcantly more likely to change to a BKK. We have chosen gross income as
an indicator of the ﬁnancial state of an individual, since the contributions to the sickness
funds in the German public health insurance system are payroll taxes. We thus capture
the ﬁnancial incentives for changing. In absolute terms, individuals with higher incomes
beneﬁt more from lower contribution rates.
Individuals in substitute funds, or funds other than regional ones, are signiﬁcantly
more likely to change to a BKK. Again, there is potentially a component which measures
11In our estimate we cannot control for the ﬁfth variable included in the scheme, namely, sick pay
claims. This variable is not available in the GSOEP. We are optimistic, however, that this does not
change results.
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incentives in these dummy variables: from ﬁgure 1 we know that substitute funds have
slightly lower contribution rates than the regional funds. The latter are the reference
category in our estimation. We would expect a negative sign, since members of regional
funds beneﬁt more from changing to a BKK, but what we observe is a positive and
signiﬁcant sign for the coeﬃcients. Although this result is in contrast to the incentive
interpretation, it does not raise doubts about it. It only shows that these highly aggregated
dummy variables fail to measure the contribution rate eﬀect properly. In the GSOEP,
contribution rates are not available before 1999. Schwarze and Andersen (2001) take
contribution rate eﬀects into account for the 1999-2000 change.
More highly educated people (measured in years) are less likely to change although this
eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. White collar workers are signiﬁcantly more likely to change to a
BKK than other workers. Both full-time and part-time workers are more likely to change
to the BKK than the reference category (see the variable “less time” in table 4) although
the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. The unemployed are less likely to change. Again this eﬀect
is not signiﬁcant. These variables are included anyway to control for the diﬀerent labor
market status of individuals which can also be related to the ﬂexibility and activity level
of individuals. Women are more likely to change and foreigners less likely. Neither eﬀect
is signiﬁcant.
We included the probability of disability in the estimation as the only objective health
variable aﬀecting the health insurance decision. Our identifying assumption normally is
that objective health variables aﬀect the transition probability only via the health status
equation. Probability of disability is an exception to this rule, since this variable is also
included in the institutional risk adjustment scheme as outlined above. However, this
variable has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the transition probability. Adjusting for
disability may be important with regard to the stock of members. But it is not important
when analyzing the ﬂow to the BKKs.
The indicator for not being a single household aﬀects the transition probability nega-
tively. The variable may be interpreted as measuring higher transaction costs of changing
when there are family insured members. However, the eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Older individuals are signiﬁcantly less likely to change to a BKK. The reason for this
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behavior can be found in the higher transaction cost at later stages of life. It may be
more diﬃcult for older people to become informed about the possibility of changing, and,
more importantly, older people are better informed about their current sickness fund,
because of their sickness history. If, for instance, they apply for a course of treatment
they know exactly what to do and whom to contact. This knowledge is lost when the
fund is changed.
As we expected from table 2, all coeﬃcients for the year dummies are signiﬁcantly
positive and increasing over time. Over the years more individuals become informed
about the possibility of changing. Additionally, diverging contribution rates increase the
ﬁnancial beneﬁts of changing. This points to potential hazardous dynamics in the German
health insurance system. This result is in line with Greß et al. (2002). They analyze the
price sensitivity of sickness fund choice in Germany and ﬁnd increasing price elasticities
over time.
7.3 Public policy
The empirical model developed in this study accounts for many plausible economic ef-
fects. The goodness of ﬁt measures suggest that the model ﬁts the data reasonably well,
especially considering that only about three percent of the non-BKK members actually
change. Our conclusions for current public policy debate in Germany is that there should
be some mechanism which takes account of the changing health structure of the diﬀerent
types of public sickness funds. According to our central result—that health aﬀects the
transition probability—the risk compensation scheme does not properly take account of
the dynamics in the system, i.e. risk adjustment is incomplete. There are no alternatives
to introducing some morbidity measures or health status measures, and these should be
introduced as soon as possible, since the distortions increase over time. We provide a
simple measure, namely the continuous health index, that can be used to improve risk
adjustment. From the predictive power perspective, health status is not the most pre-
ferred variable (see Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). However, adding health status as a third
explanatory variable to age and gender signiﬁcantly improves the risk adjustment (for
U.S. data see Pope et al., 1998, and Newhouse et al., 1989).
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8 Conclusion
In 1996, a natural experiment started by the opening of the German statutory health
insurance market to competition. People insured were now allowed to choose their sickness
fund freely. To avoid adverse selection, insurance companies are not allowed to reject new
applicants. Moreover, a risk compensation scheme was introduced to oﬀset comparative
advantages resulting from diﬀering risk structures. The transitions towards the company-
based sickness funds (BKKs), together with the low contribution rates, raise doubts about
whether the scheme fully controls for diﬀerent risk proﬁles. The aim of the paper was to
check this using data from the GSOEP.
Studies using micro data provided by sickness funds usually ﬁnd that the risk adjust-
ment scheme is incomplete (see e.g. Breyer and Kifmann, 2001). But this was never
shown using GSOEP data. There is some evidence for incompleteness in the recent re-
port by Lauterbach and Wille (2001) but they do not come up with any signiﬁcance
level. This is one advantage of our statistical model. Andersen and Schwarze (1999) and
Schwarze and Andersen (2001) produce ambiguous and insigniﬁcant results for this issue.
We show, using a econometric model diﬀerent from those used in the studies cited above,
that signiﬁcant incompleteness of the scheme can be found using GSOEP data.
We used a recursive bivariate probit model to analyze the transitions to BKKs. In
the ﬁrst equation, individual health is estimated. Using the self-assessed health status
as the dependent variable, we obtain a continuous health index from more objective
determinants of health and health care use. This provides a much better approximation
of the actual health status since health is continuous rather than discrete like the GSOEP
variable. The discreteness of health together with the substantial measurement error
causes an endogeneity bias when estimating the transition equation alone. We control for
endogeneity and obtain consistent estimates by estimating a simultaneous two equation
system.
We found that health status positively, and signiﬁcantly, aﬀects the probability of
changing to a BKK. Since we controlled for the variables used in the risk compensation
scheme, the scheme can be judged as incomplete. Using income, age, gender, sick pay
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claims, and incapacity for work does not fully oﬀset diﬀerent risk structures. Thus, the
problem of adverse selection, already present in the German health insurance market, will
increase over time. We can conclude from our empirical model that both the younger and
the healthier individuals are more likely to change to a BKK, i.e. there is not only an age
eﬀect but also a health eﬀect.
Some health measures have to be included in the risk compensation scheme to reduce
or to remove the distortions in sickness fund competition. This may be done by some
measures of morbidity. Thus we underline the current plan of the government of introduc-
ing morbidity measures to the scheme. Since this reform is planned for 2007, and since
there is a lively debate about this issue, it is still unclear whether this reform will really
be established. Our analysis shows (i) the necessity of the reform, (ii) that it would be
better to do it today rather than tomorrow, as distortions increase over time, and (iii)
that a simple health status index could be used to mitigate the problem.
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Figure 1: Percentage contribution rate averages for the diﬀerent types of sick-
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Figure 2: Members in 1,000,000 (without their dependants) of the diﬀerent
types of sickness funds. Source: BMG (2001, p. 344).
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Tables
year overall regional company- substitute
funds based funds funds
1991 1,209 276 721 15
1992 1,223 271 741 15
1993 1,221 269 744 15
1994 1,152 235 719 15
1995 960 92 690 15
1996 642 20 532 15
1997 554 18 457 14
1998 482 18 386 13
1999 455 17 361 13
2000 420 17 337 12
2001 396 17 318 12
Table 1: Number of active sickness funds in the German statutory health insurance mar-
ket, other funds are omitted. Source: BMG (2001, p. 342).
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year N full sample N after selection percentage of changers
1995 13,768 1,713 1.23
1996 13,511 3,571 1.96
1997 13,283 3,431 2.80
1998 14,670 3,463 3.03
1999 14,085 3,550 4.17
overall 69,317 15,728 2.80
Table 2: Sample selection and the percentage of changers. Source: GSOEP 1995-2000,
own calculations.
age N percentage of percentage of healthy
changers all changers non changers
25 – 29 2,609 3.99 76.39 77.88 76.33
30 – 34 3,139 3.50 68.84 77.27 68.54
35 – 39 3,070 2.54 62.38 67.95 62.23
40 – 44 2,626 2.32 53.08 63.93 52.83
45 – 49 2,452 2.00 48.53 67.35 48.15
50 – 54 1,832 2.07 42.03 47.37 41.92
overall 15,728 2.80 59.91 70.23 59.62




health status self-assessed health status, 1 = good or very good health, 0 else
wbkk change to a BKK, 1 = yes, 0 = no
log(net income) natural logarithm of net income
log(gross income) natural logarithm of gross income
education time years in the education system
age age in years
number doctor visits number of visits to doctors during the last three months
exogenous dummies:
substitute fund 1 = membership in a substitute fund
other funds 1 = membership in other funds
regional fund∗ 1 = membership in a regional fund
full time 1 = full time employed
part time 1 = part time employed
less time∗ 1 = short working hours, self-employed, maternity leave,...
no single 1 = no single household
yearXX 1 = year 19XX, year95∗
disabled/incapacity 1 = disability or incapacity for work
white collar 1 = white collar employee
unemployed 1 = unemployed
female 1 = female
foreigner 1 = non-German nationality
impair 1 = health status prevents from completing everyday tasks
doctor visit 1 = at least one visit to a doctor during the last three months
hospital stay 1 = hospital stay during the last year
sick 6 weeks 1 = work disability for longer than 6 weeks during the last year
sport 1 = active sport at least once a month
Table 4: Explanations of variables. Note: ∗ indicates that the variable is a reference
category in our estimation.
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Variable Mean SD Min Max
health status 0.5991 0.4901 0 1
log(gross income) 8.1380 0.5021 4.6151 11.3767
substitute fund 0.4796 0.4996 0 1
other funds 0.0988 0.2984 0 1
full time 0.8362 0.3701 0 1
part time 0.1469 0.3541 0 1
no single 0.6804 0.4663 0 1
year96 0.2274 0.4189 0 1
year97 0.2181 0.4130 0 1
year98 0.2202 0.4144 0 1
year99 0.2257 0.4181 0 1
disabled/incapacity 0.0451 0.2075 0 1
education time 11.8831 2.4412 0 18
white collar 0.5238 0.4995 0 1
unemployed 0.0598 0.2372 0 1
female 0.4512 0.4976 0 1
foreigner 0.1307 0.3371 0 1
age 38.4865 8.1378 25 54
log(net income) 7.7008 0.4843 4.6151 10.3090
impair 0.2528 0.4346 0 1
doctor visit 0.6285 0.4832 0 1
number doctor visits 2.0167 3.4027 0 90
hospital stay 0.0828 0.2756 0 1
sick 6 weeks 0.0408 0.1977 0 1
sport 0.3384 0.4732 0 1
observations 15,728
Table 5: Sample Statistics. Source: GSOEP 1995-2000, own calculations.
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Health Status Transition
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
health status 0.0578∗ 0.0327
log(gross income) 0.1857∗∗∗ 0.0588
substitute fund 0.1232∗∗ 0.0558
other funds 0.3231∗∗∗ 0.0641
full time 0.1665 0.1799
part time 0.1478 0.2121





disabled/incapacity −0.2008∗∗∗ 0.0625 0.0592 0.0944
education time 0.0106∗∗ 0.0054 −0.0062 0.0098
white collar 0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0280 0.1231∗∗ 0.0579
unemployed −0.0977∗∗ 0.0483 −0.1341 0.1082
female 0.0144 0.0292 0.0169 0.0499
foreigner 0.1644∗∗∗ 0.0364 −0.0329 0.0718
age −0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0014 −0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0032
log(net income) 0.0318 0.0281
impair −1.3687∗∗∗ 0.0284
doctor visit −0.2007∗∗∗ 0.0282
number doctor visits −0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0054
hospital stay −0.1697∗∗∗ 0.0442
sick 6 weeks −0.2172∗∗∗ 0.0676
sport 0.1742∗∗∗ 0.0250
const 1.4449∗∗∗ 0.2223 −3.5332∗∗∗ 0.4378
Observations 15,728
Log likelihood -8047.00 -1929.45
Pseudo R2 0.2402 0.0388
LR chisq(14/18) 5087.39 155.92
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10
Table 6: Simultaneous estimates of the recursive probit model.
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